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Financial fragility of a country is the systemic risk of its debtors to default. With open capital 
markets, financial flows in international currency become more and more independent from 
trade and service flows. This political-oriented study investigates how exchange rate 
arrangements of Central and Eastern Europe countries increase or reduce financial fragility, 
stemming particularly from the moral-hazard problem, the original-sin problem, and 
commitment problems. It further discusses whether future EU members will face an increase of 
financial fragility when entering the ERM II. The study finds (a) that moral hazard plays a minor 
role in candidate countries. An independent float, like the one for Poland’s currency, cannot 
reduce the vulnerability against a financial crisis. More problems result from original sins and 
commitment problems, the latter being closely related to the institutional weaknesses of 
transition countries. The study finds further (b) that, against this background, currency boards 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania) and managed floats (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Romania and Slovenia) present the best results in reducing financial fragility. Currency boards 
succeeded due to the small debt and equity markets, some lender-of-last-resort function of 
central banks, and a high integration of the trade and banking industry with the base currency 
region (EU). The advantages are less obvious for larger countries with less developed and 
integrated markets. Finally, the study finds (c) that the switch to ERM II will probably increase 
financial fragility of the independent float country Poland since the currency appreciated more 
during the float period than before. With an overvalued currency, increased sterilisation efforts 
might lead to liquidity constraints. Otherwise, expected depreciation might trigger speculative 
attacks. The misalignment problem is less present in case of managed floats. Hungary 
unilaterally introduced recently the ERM II setting, and crisis vulnerability increased. Official 
membership of ERM II, however, would lower the risk potential. The fix peg of Latvia’s 
currency is sustainable due to reasons similar for other Baltic countries. The widening of the 
band in the case of ERM II would not generate any additional financial risk. 




1.  Introduction 
With fundamental liberalisation of financial markets in developed countries and of capital 
accounts worldwide, systemic financial fragility of emerging market economies increased. A 
number of financial crises (currency and financial sector crises) upset the world economy in the 
last two decades. Compared with ‘classic’ demand and terms of trade shocks, financial 
shocks broke out quite independently from real economy developments. In reaction to 
increasing financial vulnerability, we observe a shift away from intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements1 during the last decade. The share of free floats and hard pegs increased whilst 
the share of intermediate solutions shrank (Chart 1). This shift can be explained by the so-
called open-economy trilemma ( Obstfeld and Taylor 1998): a country cannot have free 
capital markets, a pegged exchange rate and follow an autonomous monetary policy. Such a 
combination rather raises the risk for a misalignment of the exchange rate. The advice is: give 
up either any exchange rate goal or any monetary policy. 
Central and East European (CEE) countries are exposed to financial crises since economic 
transition started. We observe a similar shift away from intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements towards currency boards or floats (Chart 2). We find two questions to be 
answered: (a) since also currency boards, which are very hard versions of a fix peg, may 
collapse (Argentina) we will ask why these arrangements survived in CEE countries. (b) Most 
of the countries will soon become a member of the European Union (EU), and will somewhat 
later adopt the Euro. The way toward the Euro consists of a return to intermediate solutions 
(the ERM II is a fix peg within a wide band), and, later, euroisation through EMU 
membership. Will the move from either side to ERM II increase financial fragility? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the problem of financial 
fragility from a more conceptual viewpoint. The role of the exchange rate arrangement will be 
treated prominently. This chapter will show that the choice of the exchange rate is a trickier 
task in the presence of financial shocks than under traditional conditions of demand and terms-
of-trade shocks. Section 3 turns to the EU candidate countries and starts with an overview of 
crisis risk potentials and the exchange rate arrangement. In the following, we discuss the case 
of an exchange rate float and ask why some pegged arrangements including currency boards 
survived. Section 4 concludes taking the perspective of EMU membership. 
2.  On the nature of financial fragility 
Financial fragility is the weakness of a debtor to absorb a financial shock. Systemic financial 
fragility means that a whole economy is vulnerable against those shocks like a bank run or a 
sudden reversal of capital flows; its central bank might run out of international reserve money. 
If so, a financial crisis breaks out. For the understanding of the relation between the exchange 
                                                 
1  We define an arrangement as intermediate when the central bank follows a declared 




rate arrangement and financial fragility, the nature of financial shocks plays a role as well as the 
specific institutional framework of the financial sector. 
A market economy is based upon financial contracts discharged over time -- a scheme that 
constitutes for the holder of a financial claim a basic risk of getting repaid. The fundamental 
change in financial markets of developed countries and the worldwide capital account 
liberalisation increased this basic risk. In the world economic order before, international 
financial flows were closely linked to real economy flows: commodities and services, which 
served as ‘solid’ collaterals. Under the new framework, the financial sector became active in 
international business and financial flows became independent from trade flows. The 
disintegration of international trade and finance created new kinds of contracts, parts of them 
devoted to provide collateral based upon reputation (for example, derivatives). The daily 
transactions on world foreign exchange markets amounted to 1,500 bn US dollars on average 
in 1998. World exports accounted for only a small portion of this number.2 
Such large amounts add an additional factor to macroeconomic models and to the choice of 
the exchange rate arrangement: financial shocks. In the legacy of the Mundell-Fleming model, 
exchange rate arrangements were discussed under the prevalence of demand and terms-of-
trade shocks. With a pegged exchange rate, a shock would be directly transmitted to the 
economy through the reduction of international reserve and thus a reduction of money supply, 
and thus, given wage rigidities, to aggregate demand. Debtors default due to shrinking revenue 
and/or lack of international reserve. The move to a floating exchange rate would ensure, that 
the shock would reduce neither money supply nor international reserves. Devaluation would 
cushion the shock at the expense of higher inflation. The critical point is that this basic model 
fits rather into a world in which payment flows were seen not to affect the long-run trajectories 
of the economies (Studart 2001, p. 639). It is a picture of the 1950s and 1960s where the 
financial sector was rather passive in international business. 
The nature of modern financial fragility makes the choice of the optimal exchange rate 
arrangement more complicated than in the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework. Some of 
the recent crises were much more related to the changes in financial markets in developed 
economies than to changes in the fundamentals of the crises countries in Asian and Latin-
America. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) condensate three hypotheses from the recent 
literature explaining financial fragility: moral hazard, the original sin and the commitment 
problem (see Box 1). 
                                                 




Box 1: Explaining financial fragility – three hypotheses 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard of agents who borrow abroad is likely when they can expect to be bailed out. 
Bailing out means the existence of explicit or implicit guarantees given by a third party (the 
government, or an international institution like the IMF). Corporations and banks are not forced 
to hedge their foreign exposures. The result is excessive risk taking. 
Original-sin 
A history of high inflation and strong and frequent depreciations undermines confidence in the 
currency of the borrowing country. The currency is not accepted as international reserve money, 
that is, lenders do not accept debt in this currency. Banks and corporations are not able to hedge 
their foreign exposure. The result is a currency and/or maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities. 
Commitment problem 
Financial contracts are charged over time. If law enforcement i s weak, if there is a lack of 
collateral or if the institutional framework is weak, the willingness to repay could be constrained. 
The consequence could be high spreads on interests that increase financial fragility. 
Moral hazard means that agents feel sure to be bailed out if they run into repayment difficulties. 
Explicit or implicit guarantees prevent them from hedging their foreign exposures against the 
exchange rate risk. A pegged exchange rate is an implicit guarantee given by the Central Bank, 
mainly to banks and to the government. The costs of this guarantee are normally outweighed 
by the gains a pegged exchange rate offers. If moral hazard led to excessive risk taking of, say, 
the banking sector, the cost, however, might outweigh gains. The banking sector might expand 
its balance sheet without being limited by its equity capital. The literature describes over-
borrowing abroad (McKinon and Pill 1997) and a lending boom (Krugman 1998) as possible 
consequences: most of short-term financed investment is a llocated in assets. Increased 
demand for assets is often constrained by supply (land or stock shares), hence, asset prices 
rise, the quality of bank assets will deteriorate and lending rates increase. The Central bank 
becomes more and more under pressure to put a brake on increasing interest rates. When 
domestic credit exceeds the amount trade and real growth can absorb, capital inflows might 
reverse, and the asset bubble bursts. 
If moral hazard constitutes the main source of financial fragility, then two p olicy 
recommendabious can be found in the literature: 
-  Reverse of liberalisation of the capital account, 
-  more flexibility of the exchange rate, in the extreme case an independent float in 
order to force agents to hedge risks. 
With a float the financial fragility will not diminish, when the borrowers of a country are not 
able to hedge. Hedging means that there is a final lender who accepts debt in the domestic 
currency of the borrower. Borrowers in developing countries have often difficulties to hedge 
their f oreign exposure since hedging might be too costly or the currency is generally not 
accepted. If so, a floating exchange rate is not the optimal arrangement. The currency 




currencies of developing and East European countries play: five currencies (US dollar, Euro, 
Yen, Pound sterling and Swiss Franc) represented 95 % of debt in 2000. The remaining five 
per cent included the currencies of other industrial countries, of developing and transition 
countries. If the domestic currency is not accepted as international reserve money, either a 
currency or a maturity mismatch of commitments can follow. A currency mismatch evolves 
when investment financed by international credit yields only revenue in domestic currency. A 
maturity mismatch evolves when long-term investment is financed by short-term international 
credit. 
Why borrowers of a country are unable to hedge is not very clear. A certain history of inflation 
and strong depreciations (Eichengreen and Hausmann) may play a role, therefore, the term 
‘original sin’. With independent floats agents expect depreciations in case of a currency 
mismatch, and purchase foreign exchange to cover their exposures with the consequence of 
further depreciation. The likely outcome is a high volatility of interest rates. This is the reason 
why central banks all around the world are reluctant to let the market do its work, and raise 
interest rates or follow a managed (‘dirty’) float. Two reasons might explain the reluctance to 
rely on the market: (a) the fear that a depreciation due to the given inflation differential could 
seriously hurt the still vulnerable domestic banking system; and (b), the concern that a 
depreciation could lead to higher inflation and thereby damage the monetary authorities’ 
reputation. With these typical original-sin problems, the fear is that a depreciation would 
trigger a downturn in investors confidence and result in even sharper reversals in net capital 
inflows. If the central bank tries to avoid depreciations and raises its interest rates, the 
structure of capital inflows might change towards the short end – financial fragility would 
increase. 
A fix peg is not an alternative. If the central bank tried to defend the peg by interest hikes the 
liquidity situation of corporations, banks and the government would deteriorate, short-term 
capital then usually fills the gap and financial fragility increases. The trade-off between 
defending the peg and other aims of the government will lead to multiple equilibria and self-
fulfilling currency crises. 
Is a currency board a safer haven? A currency board is characterised as a constitutionally 
backed commitment of the central bank to intervene at any time on the foreign exchange 
market, coupled with the prohibition to sterilise. The latter is the difference to a fix peg: the 
central bank cannot take money from the market to defend the peg nor can it provide money 
(= loss of lender-of-last-resort function). Two possible risks emerge: (1) Financial fragility can 
increase due to spillover effects from trade shocks, when the currency of the main trading 
partner devalues. The recent collapse of Argentina’s currency provides a good example.3 (2) 
A currency board is not immune against a bank run (see also the model of  Chang and 
                                                 
3  The Peso was tied to the US dollar, but only 12 % of trade was conducted with the US and 30 
% with Brasil. The Real depreciated in January 1999 by 40 %, hurting Argentina’s 
international competitiveness. The country slid into a severe recession, and financial 




Velasco,  1998).  When factor prices are insufficiently demand-elastic, a bank run could 
severely hurt the liquidity position of banks. The financial risks of a pure currency board are 
the reason why they are so rare. Central banks intend to keep some, but not all reserves 
above money circulation ensuring a certain lender-of-last resort function and to keep some 
tools for managing money supply (a minimum reserve holding of banks, for example). 
Literature offers no currency as the solution. Indeed, mismatch problems as well as too much 
risk-taking would not appear with complete dollarisation or euroisation. The problem is, 
however, that the stock of reserves available at the moment needs to be high enough to cover 
not only (technically) the circulation of cash, but also deposits. The longer and the more severe 
the history of inflation and devaluation of a country, the less the public’s confidence in 
monetary authorities and into the banking system, hence the higher should be the monetary 
aggregate to be covered (in the extreme case: M3). The problem can be solved by contractual 
dollarisation. In the case of unilaterial dollarisation, the lack of adequate reserves for covering 
deposits might otherwise trigger a bank run. 
A n o-currency is neither a solution when agents are not willing to hedge or to repay. This 
unwillingness is the direct consequence of weak commitment devices the modern financial 
world provides. In the ‘old’ world, financial contracts represented trade flows. The financial 
claim was almost completely covered by the collateral -- the traded item. With developing 
financial derivatives and financial institutions the close tie between claim and collateral broke. 
The value of financial contracts tends to exceed by  far the value of the collateral that an 
institution is able to provide. An enforcement problem in countries with weak institutional 
framework and property rights might increase the commitment problem. Russia provides an 
example, but also borrowers in Asian countries were suspected to be unwilling to repay, often 
trying to hide unwillingness behind inability. 
The implications for exchange rate policies are less obvious. Where the financial infrastructure 
is least developed, the markets may most need a lender of last resort, and the lender of last 
resort needs the freedom granted by a flexible exchange rate policy. A currency board or 
dollarisation/euroisation are no means to reduce financial fragility if it stems from a commitment 
problem. On the other hand, in case of a float, expected devaluations cause lenders to demand 
higher spreads, which might trigger a self-fulfilling crisis (Eichengreen and Hausmann). 
The financial crises of the previous decade directed the attention of research and policies also 
to t he institutional settings of the financial sector in crisis countries. When capital account 
restrictions are lifted, the quality of supervision and monitoring of the financial sector 
(Williamson and Miller, 1998) as well as the degree of international integration of the banking 
industry plays a role for increasing or reducing financial fragility. A low quality and integration 
hit first Japan’s economy when financial deregulation and a loose monetary policy started in 
the 1980s, causing a ‘slow-moving financial crisis’ between 1991 and 1996 (Fukao, 2001) 
with severe impacts on the other Asian economies. Foreign ownership, for example, might 
help to improve monitoring and auditing, and can even substitute for the lender-of-last-resort 
function of the central bank; a fix peg becomes more sustainable. Chan-Lau and Chen (1998) 




had better supervision and monitoring, developed from longer experience in financial business, 
and were less prone to financial crisis if not immune to them. Both countries are rather small 
and their banking industry is completely integrated into the international financial world. We 
will see that a specific combination of all the factors mentioned above drives financial fragility in 
CEE countries. 
3.  Financial fragility and exchange rate arrangements in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
3.1 Is there a systematic link? 
Measuring a country’s vulnerability to financial shocks/crises became one of the leading areas 
in empirical research after the Asian crises in 1997. We use an approach by Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhard (1997) presented and tested by hand of developing countries: the so-
called signals approach. The approach is based upon single macroeconomic and financial 
indicators. Brüggemann and Linne (2002) tested it for EU candidate countries and merged the 
single indicators into a composite indicator. Compared with probability approaches (Frankel 
and Rose, 1996; Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1996), which deliver short-term 
prognoses for a crisis to private investors, the medium-term oriented signals approach is more 
targeted at policy recommendations. Whilst the probability approaches may capture 
contagion, the signals approach can identify a change in fundamentals (policy failures and 
spillover effects from trade shocks) and problems in the banking sector as reasons for 
increasing fragility. 
The most prominent consequence of a crisis or crisis–preventing measures is a re-arrangement 
of the country’s exchange rate system. But is there any systematic link between a change of 
the risk potential and the exchange rate arrangement in EU candidate countries? The changes 
of the composite indicators for the risk potentials of EU accession countries are presented in 
Chart 3. The shadowed areas inform about the 18-month period before a financial crisis. In 
this perspective, countries with a fix peg may have (Czech Republic) and may not have 
(Hungary, Latvia) a currency crisis. There seems to be evidence that countries with a currency 
board did not experience a financial crisis, and their vulnerability is rather on the decline 
(Bulgaria and Estonia). Nevertheless, the signals approach marks a strong increase of 
vulnerability for currency board countries and Lativa in the aftermath of the Russian financial 
crisis from fall 1998. We can explain this increase by spillover effects from trade with Russia. 
The managed float arrangements (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Romania and Slovenia) 
show a similar positive development of the composite indicator, though a financial crisis broke 
out twice in Romania (December 1996 and January 1997). Nevertheless, the match between 
interest rate targeting (against inflation) and exchange rate flexibility (against short-term capital 
inflow) seems to be more successful than in the case of the independent float of the Polish 
Zloty. The rapid increase of the risk potential was followed by speculative attacks against the 




3.2 Is moral hazard the main problem? 
The moral-hazard hypothesis predicts that capital flows should be large or, too much than 
´socially optimal` (Eichengreen and Hausmann). Actually, capital flows seem to be rather low 
(Table 2). The share of the consolidated4 international claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis 
Eastern Europe in their GDP accounted for a mere 0.7 % – by far less than for Western 
Europe. There seems to be, however, some difference between countries with a float and a 
peg. The ´Peggers` (countries with a fix peg, a narrow crawling band or a currency board, 
marked with a ‘P’) tend to show a higher share than countries with a flexible arrangement. 
Estonia is a remarkable case with a share of 33.3 %. On the other side we find Poland with its 
independent float and a share of only 0.1 %. Since there is a lack of clear determination what 
is ‘socially optimal’, more information is needed, for example, on exchange rate volatility or the 
real exchange rate,5 in order to identify a moral hazard problem. 
The moral-hazard hypothesis predicts furthermore that capital inflows will take such forms, 
which most likely will benefit from a bailout – these are banks and the government. Banks are 
more likely to be bailed out by the government or the central bank than private companies due 
to the perceived threat to macroeconomic and financial stability. Governments are also likely 
to be bailed out by international aid, for example granted by the IMF. The sectoral structure of 
the consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks shows that the share of claims vis-
à-vis banks and governments is lower for CEE countries, Asian countries and Latin America 
than for Western Europe, with Russia being the exception. Peg arrangements show a even 
lower share than float arrangements, though it should be the reverse if the moral-hazard 
hypothesis were to hold. High capital inflow to Estonia should be seen as a moral hazard sign 
only if the structure were in favour of claims against banks and the government. Most foreign 
investment, however, is long-term and into the private non-banking sector. 
Lending to Asian and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean countries and to Eastern Europe 
concentrates more on the non-bank private sector than in developed countries. The low share 
of lending to banks and governments in CEE is rather an argument for the original-sin and the 
commitment view. In regions with a weak banking sector, international lenders prefer debtors 
who can provide a solid collateral. Whilst banks can provide only reputation, the private 
company sector offers more solid insurance. 
The share of short-term debt is another indicator for the nature of financial fragility. The moral-
hazard view includes that the exchange-rate insurance implied by a policy of pegging the 
currency is most credible over short horizon. The share of short-term lending to Eastern 
Europe is, however, small compared to Western Europe, Asia and Pacific or Latin America. 
                                                 
4  Consolidated means amongst other things that positions between offices of the same bank 
are being netted out.  
5  If moral hazard existed, the real exchange rate should not be overvalued when the nominal 




Float arrangements even show the highest shares of short-term lending (Czech Republic, 
Romania, Poland). 
Public short-term debt or mass privatisation is one of the driving forces for emerging domestic 
debt and equrity markets. Moral hazard cannot play any significant role when the government 
does not run fiscal deficits, financed by T-bills or when privatisation is based upon (foreign) 
direct investment. In general, debt and equity markets are too small in CEE countries to attract 
large foreign portfolio inflows.6 Take Estonia as an example: short-term public debt was zero 
(Table 3), short-term capital inflows served to finance trade. 
3.3 The pitfalls of an independent float: the case of Poland 
When moral hazard does not exist, an independent float cannot prevent financial fragility. This 
shall be briefly shown by the case of Poland. 
The National Bank increased gradually the flexibility of the Z loty. With capital account 
liberalisation in 1995, capital inflows gained momentum, and the flexibility of the Zloty was 
significantly raised: first in May 1995 when the band around the central parity was widened 
from – 2.5 % to – 7 %. The National Bank expanded the band to – 10 % in February 1998, 
and – 12.5 % in October and to – 15 % in March 1999. The band was abandoned in April 
2000 when the National Bank declared an independent float and direct inflation targeting.
7 
Although Poland’s economy did not suffer from a financial crisis, its vulnerability increased 
since the Zloty started to float independently. This increase stemmed from a real appreciation 
initiated by strong capital inflows. 
If moral hazard was the root of financial fragility, and if agents had rational expectations, 
hedging activities should prevent an excessive deviation of the free spot exchange rate from the 
purchasing power parity. In Chart 4, the exchange rate’s hypothetical course following the 
purchasing power parity was extrapolated by use of the trend line of the central parity (the 
latter valid until 11 April 2000). The gap between the hypothetical central parity and the actual 
exchange rate widened in Euro terms until July 2001. The Zloty came under speculative 
pressure in July 2001 for the first time since the Russian financial crisis in August 1998 and 
devalued by about 13 % within two weeks. Since then, the Zloty appreciated again. 
Capital inflows were also attracted by domestic equity and debt markets. Mass privatisation 
schemes established an equity market large enough to attract foreign portfolio investors. Public 
debt (44 % of GDP in the third quarter of 2001) was among the highest compared with other 
                                                 
6  The CEE country with the highest number of traded bonds in 2000 was Slovakia (108). In Estonia only 6 
bonds were traded. The London debt market includes 5,300 bonds. On equity markets, market 
capitalisation ratios reached from 3.1 % in Romania to 35 % in Estonia in 2000 (EBRD 2001). Market 
capitalisation was 130 % in Frankfurt, 185 % in London, and 719 % in Paris. 
7  Actually, the independent float is not complete: the National Bank purchased from time to 




transition countries, and a relatively high share (4.5 %) was in T-bills. Although there were 
some official restrictions on short-term capital flows, the National Bank handled them liberally. 
Privatisation of banks gained momentum since 1998. The banking sector is now 
overwhelmingly privately owned with 56 % of foreign share in statutory capital. However, 
banks still held a relatively high share of bad performing loans in their portfolio in 1999 (14 % 
compared to 9 % in Hungary) illustrating commitment problems in the economy. With original-
sin problems of the Polish economy, the float failed since the National Bank raised interest 
rates when inflation exceeded the targeted path. This prevented the Zloty to devalue and 
attracted foreign portfolio capital even causing an appreciation. 
3.4 Why did the ‘Peggers’ survive? 
Hungary’s crawling peg was within margins of – 2.25 % until May 2001. A relatively high 
capital inflow and share of international bank claims vis-à-vis domestic banks and the 
government (Table 1) could indicate moral hazard problems. The almost fix peg remained 
sustainable, because the National Bank defended it by a restrictive handling of still existing 
short-term capital controls, allowing for somewhat higher interest rates than without controls. 
Another feature was that the banking sector was re-structured more successfully than in other 
countries. The share of short-term debt in total debt was less than average. Although the 
domestic debt market is rather large in CEE comparison, it was not attractive for foreign 
speculators due to the restrictions on the capital account. Last but not least, state owned 
enterprises were preferably sold to strategic investors and not privatised by vouchers or 
equities. Capital inflows were overwhelmingly in form of foreign direct investment. 
Nevertheless, financial fragility started to increase in early 2000. The Forint appreciated in real 
terms and the balance of payment deteriorated. In this context, the lifting of capital controls in 
May 2001 could cause a problem. In facing this challenge, the National Bank widened the 
band to – 15 % in May 2001, and finally abandoned the crawling peg in October 2001 
(approaching the EMR II solution). The problem, however, is that the Forint appreciated since 
then, approaching the lower band border in January 2002 (Chart 5). As in the Polish case, 
interest policy of the National Bank is too restrictive and lures additional capital into the 
country.8 
Baltic countries: Among the Baltic countries, two have long-lasting currency boards: Estonia 
and Lithuania, and Latvia has a fix peg. In first approximation, these pegs survived due to the 
relatively small financial markets and the almost complete international integration of the 
banking industry (Sutela, 2001). The sizes of equity and debt markets is not attractive for large 
                                                 
8 This statement can be evaluated by using the Taylor rule for finding the interest rate target adequate to 
fight inflation (about 13 % on year’s average). But the interest differential is to large to cover the sum of 
the targeted exchange rate change and the risk premium. Hence, domestic financial market is in 




international investors. The relative sizes of debt markets is small due to low public debt. 
Public debt is at 3.2 % of GDP (2001) in Estonia, but short-term debt is zero (Table 2). 
Short-term public debt in terms of GDP was 1.5 % in Lithuania, and in Bulgaria (another 
currency board) 2.9 %. Privatisation in the Baltic countries followed (as in Hungary) patterns 
of direct sales to strategic investors; equity markets remained small. Hence, most capital 
inflows are long-term (FDI) or trade-related (short-term). Most banks in Estonia are in foreign 
ownership. There is, simply said, few room for moral hazard problems. 
Add to this that Baltic currency boards are more like fix peg arrangments. From the very 
beginning, the money base of Estonia was more than covered by international reserve and the 
central bank could use these reserves if the banking sector ran into liquidity problems. The 
Eesti Pank hence has a lender-of-last resort function (which in a pure currency board is not 
existent). What is more, all ‘currency boards’ include the option to change obligatory reserves 
for sterilisation purposes. To fight off speculative attacks during the Asian crises, the Eesti 
Pank increased obligatory reserves in mid 1997.9 Defending the fix peg this way generated 
some liquidity bottlenecks in the banking sector with the consequence of higher interest rates. 
On second thought, a fix peg with restricted sterilisation (lender of last resort capabilities) may 
collapse due to spillover effects from trade shocks, when the currency appreciates in real 
terms. When the Russian Rouble depreciated in fall 1998, the former Baltic Soviet provinces 
were hit only marginally. Russia absorbs only 6.8 % of Estonia’s exports, 4.2 % of Latvia’s 
exports and 7.1 % of Lithuania’s exports. The share of EU in exports is between 48 % 
(Lithuania) and 69 % (Estonia).
10 Nevertheless, spillover effects on fundamentals could be 
observed in the composite risk indicator for all three countries. 
4.  Some policy conclusions in perspective of EMU membership 
EU candidate countries are obliged,  after accession to the European Union, to make all 
preparations necessary to become a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and to 
introduce the Euro (no opting-out possible). We now return to our initial question whether 
financial fragility will increase when the CEE countries join the ERM II. We split the answer 
into two parts: (a) we compare the ERM II provision with the factual exchange rate 
arrangement, and (b) assess the regime switch, hence, the move from the today’s arrangement 
to the ERM II. 
The ERM II is a fix peg within a relatively wide band of ± 15 %. The parity is to negotiate with 
the ECB; no country can set the parity autonomously. The bandwidth may be smaller, but this 
is to negotiate with the ECB (Denmark negotiated a band of ± 2.5 %). No intervention is 
allowed; central banks of new members are obliged to defend the band by effective monetary 
                                                 
9  Eesti Pank, Annual Report 1997, Tallin. 




policies, including sterilisation. After at least a two-year period without intervention and 
successful convergence of interest and inflation rates (and fiscal stability) – supervised by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) – the Euro may be introduced. This is a procedure to adjust 
the new member countries’ economy to the exchange rate, hence, to qualify the exchange rate 
as an equilibrium exchange rate. 
Independent float 
Among all exchange rate arrangement, the independent float of the Polish Zloty is at the highest 
variance to the ERM II. When, as we suspect, the nature of financial fragility is in original-sins 
and commitment problems, the independent float is not a successful way to find the equilibrium 
exchange rate. The central bank in its aim to lower the risk of a sudden reversal of capital 
inflows is forced to interest rate targeting. If the currency appreciates in real terms instead of 
depreciating, the float contributes to higher vulnerability, because the real appreciation and the 
high interest rates lure additional short-term capital into the country. The consequence might be 
a currency and maturity mismatch. 
When the strategy to find the equilibrium exchange rate by way of a float fails, the most risky 
undertaking is to enter the ERM II with an overvalued currency. The critical aspect is the 
negotiation about the fixed Euro/Zloty parity between the ECB and the National Bank. If 
markets expect an initial depreciation, a speculative attack on the Zloty might occur at the eve 
of ERM membership. If the overvalued Zloty enters the ERM II, strong adjustments in the 
company and banking sector might lead to income and liquidity losses – both would increase 
financial fragility. The idea of unilateral euroisation – recently raised by some Polish authors 
(Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2001) would fail due to the weak reserve position of the central 
bank. There was no candidate country, including Poland, with reserves covering M2 in mid 
2000 ( Gabrisch, 2001). It would also not solve the problem of a possibly overvalued 
conversion rate. From this point of view, the switch from the independent float of the Zloty to 
a fix peg is the most risky undertaking among the candidate countries. A transitory solution 
seems necessary, possibly a switch to a managed float. 
Managed float 
For a country with commitment problems and a weak financial sector a managed float is the 
preferable solution, as the risk potential pictures of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Romania suggest. When those countries enter the ERM II an implicit declaration 
to intervene is given, and, what is more, appropriate tools for sterilising capital inflows/outflows 
need to be available. If this switch was premature, the central banks’ capability to intervene 
and sterilise might be overstressed. This problem seems to be less pronounced in case of 
Slovenia with its small debt and equity markets. It could rather be a problem for the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic and Romania. The Czech Republic already slid into a financial 
crisis due to the inability to sterilise capital inflows. Since then consolidation and transformation 
of the banking industry and the equity market gained momentum, and the switch to a fix peg 




target. With the shield of the managed float, government and central bank may restructure the 
financial sector and make monetary policies more effective. 
Currencies boards and fix pegs 
Currency boards are sustainable when debt and equity markets are small and the banking 
industry is completely integrated internationally. Then there is little room for moral hazard or 
original-sin problems. When, in addition, most trade is conducted in the base currency – the 
Euro, and the central banks dispose of some tools for sterilisation, the fix peg will not 
contribute to financial fragility. Some lender-of-last-resort function of the central banks suffices 
to control the remaining commitment problems (particularly in Bulgaria). A country like Poland 
would have more problems with a currency board than the Baltic countries. 
Whilst Latvia with its true fix peg will only have to introduce the ERM II band, the currency 
board countries might face the problems of a regime switch. The EU does not regard currency 
boards as an acceptable substitute for participating in ERM II (Ecofin, 2001). Any currency 
board, as well as a fix peg, means central bank intervention every day, which is, according to 
ERM II, forbidden. Currency boards may, however, in ‘some circumstances’ constitute an 
appropriate unilateral commitment within the ERM II, for example a general exemption with 
regard to intervention. Insofar, the currency board countries could enter the ERM II with a ± 0 
% band. Anyway, this is a regime switch: from currency board to a fix peg. The markets could 
be confused about the central bank’s intention and ability to sterilise. Latvia could become a 
safer haven than Estonia and Lithuania. The risk of dangerous speculative attacks seems, 
however, to be low, the condition of the financial sector considered. Only Bulgaria might have 
a major problem, in view of the troublesome past and the still weak transition.  EU-
membership is, however, a medium-term perspective for Bulgaria. 
Intermediate solutions 
Intermediate solutions – crawling pegs and bands – present a mixed picture. Russia’s crawling 
band collapsed in summer 1998 due to a mismatch between fiscal and monetary policies. The 
huge commitment problems in the economy forced the Central Bank of Russia to raise the 
interest rate above the level that is sustainable for an active crawl. The financial market went in 
severe disequilibria. A managed float helped to calm down the situation after the crisis. 
The narrow crawling peg of the EU candidate Hungary survived due to stronger condition of 
its company and banking sector. Direct sales privatisation and the consolidation of the banking 
industry including foreign companies and banks helped to lower the typical commitment 
problem of a country in transition. The switch to the widened band increased financial fragility 
due to a real appreciation of the Forint indicating a not yet optimal tuning of intervention and 
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Chart 2: Exchange rate arrangements in Central and East European countries 
 
  Hard peg  Intermediate  Float 
 
  Currency Board  Fix peg 
 peg 
Fix band  Crawling band  managed  independent 
Bulgaria  ?        ?   
Estonia  ?           
Latvia    ?      ?   
Lithuania  ?           
Poland    ?    ?    ? 
Romania          ?   
Slovak Republic      ?    ?   
Slovenia          ?   
Czech Republic      ?    ?   
Hungary 
 
  ?    ?     
 
Sources: Corker et al. 2000 
 
 
Chart 1: Exchange rate arrangements around the world 
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Chart 3: Composite risk indicator development for selected EU candidate countries 
Estonia: July 1997 – June 2001 
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Lithuania: August 1997 – June 2001 
 
Latvia: August 1997 – June 2001 
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Hungary: June 1996 – May 2001 
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Slovak Republic: April 1997 – June 2001 
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Table 2: Consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks on individual 
countries 
End June 2000, sectors and short-term in % of total 
Absolute size in % of total claims  Claims vis-a-vis  Absolute 
change of total 









short-term up to 
one year 
Western Europe  2.1  56.9  12.5  30.6  60.4 
Eastern Europe  0.7  44.8  14.4  40.8  32.2 
Bulgaria (P)  0.2  23.5  41.1  35.3  23.7 
Czech Republic  1.1  39.0  10.0  51.0  52.0 
Estonia (P)  33.3  27.1  2.3  70.6  33.5 
Hungary (P)  3.4  42.5  22.4  35.2  30.6 
Latvia (P)  3.7  34.9  11.8  53.4  33.6 
Lithuania (P)  3.0  28.2  28.2  43.7  46.3 
Poland  0.1  32.2  20.9  46.9  37.2 
Romania  1.0  22.2  8.6  69.3  39.2 
Russia  4.2  60.3  7.6  32.1  26.0 
Slovak Republic  3.3  10.9  23.2  65.9  38.4 
Slovenia  1.7  32.9  31.3  35.8  20.8 
Asia & Pacific  n. a.   35.9  12.7  51.4  47.2 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.0  18.4  20.4  61.3  47.3 
a Change End June 1999-End June 2000, in mn of US dollars.  
Source: BIS; IMF; own calculation. _______________________________________________________________________IWH 
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Table 3: Public debt indictors of selected candidate countries (central government) 
-- IMF standard (SDSS) -- 
of which short term in %  Country  Date  bn $ 










  Oct2001  9.280  4.1  0.7  3.4  71.0  2.9 
Czech 
Republic 
Sept2001  8.000  51.3  51.3  0.0  12.7  6.5 
Estonia  Sept2001  0.160  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.2  0.0 
Hungary
a  Sept2001  29.600  21.6  17.4  4.2  58.7  12.7 
Latvia
  Sept2001  1.027  7.3  7.3  0.0  53.9  3.9 
Lithuania  Nov2001  3.277  5.0  5.0  0.0  29.0  1.5 
Poland
a  Sept2001  75.9  7.2  7.2  0.0  44.2  4.5 
Russia  Sept2001  158.0  62.9  6.6  1.5  5.1  4.1 
Slovenia  June2001  4.848  n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  27.3  n. a.  
a Including guaranteed debt. 
Sources:  Official statistics via internet: www.minfin.government.bg/en/index.html (11.01.02); 
www.mfcr.cz/cenpap/En/default.htm (11.01.02); www.stat.ee/sddseng#fiscal (16.01.02); 
www.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/index_eng.html (16.01.02); 
www.csb.lv/Ecdata/latvia123.htm#EXTERNAL%20SECTOR (16.01.02);  
www.finmin.lt/liet/prie2001/htm (16.01.2002); www.mofnet.gov.pl/sdds_en/index.shtml 
(11.01.2002); www.minfin.ru/macroeng/cg_debt.htm (11.01.2002); 
www.sigov.si/mf/angl/tekgib/avl_dolg.htm#Breakdown%20by%20Currency%20-
%20End%20of%20Q4%202000; own calculations. 
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  band   PLZ/USD (market rate, left scale)
  central parity   PLZ/EUR (right scale)
Linear (  central parity)
 
Chart 5: The exchange rate of the Hungarian Forint to the Euro between January 2001 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1October 2001: fixed parity
 